I. GOVERNMENTAL ROLES -HISTORICALLY AND TODAY
The executive branch of the federal government is the primary actor in waging war, 2 including post-war criminal prosecutions and reparations, and foreign affairs generally. 3 Congress, the other political branch, also has a role when it comes to war and foreign affairs, though smaller than the executive. 4 The judiciary, however, has traditionally refrained from weighing in on foreign policy. In 1918, the Supreme Court distinguished the two political branches from the judiciary in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 5 and held that in matters of foreign affairs, -the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.‖ 6 The Court's early pronouncements denied the states any role in foreign relations. In 1941, the Court stated, -Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.‖ 7 Nevertheless, today federal and state courts and legislatures frequently make decisions that potentially or actually impact foreign relations. 8 Sometimes, their decisions go too far and disrupt the federal executive branch's power and responsibility to speak with one voice for the nation. The Court has recently claimed some judicial power implicating foreign affairs for the judiciary. For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court proclaimed its power to check the political branches, even in times of war.
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In today's globalized world, where governments often act as private actors and individual rights are increasingly superseding old conceptions of sovereignty, 11 modern interpretation of judicial deference doctrines control.
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The act of state doctrine provides a poignant example. Whereas courts had been using the doctrine -to avoid deciding difficult cases, ing. 16 The United States and its allies during World War II initially committed to reversing Aryanizations, 17 forced sales, and duress sales via restitution of -readily identifiable works‖ directly to theft victims. 18 As the Cold War set in and the Allies implemented the Marshall Plan, however, other issues were prioritized over direct restitution. 19 Thereafter, artworks were returned to the nations from which they were taken; those nations were then expected to restitute the artworks to victims and their families, but many pieces were not restituted to their previous owners. 20 A number of nations established post-War claims tribunals, but they were not widely successful in achieving justice. 21 In order for victims to claim property, they needed to come forward with whatever scraps of evidence they could find in an era of destruction, closed archives, strict privacy laws, persistent anti-Semitism, Cold War lines, and no Internet. Injustice pervaded post-War restitution. France simply incorporated Jewish-owned artworks into the collection of the Louvre without ever attempting to return them to the victims and their families. 23 In Austria, victims seeking restitution of artworks were forced to make donations of other property in exchange for the necessary export permits to take the artworks to their new homelands. 24 Renewed public attention to such scandals in the mid-to-late 1990s strengthened U.S. resolve to effectuate its War-era promises through means that included use of the courts to resolve state law claims.
III. JUDICIAL RESTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Judicial restitution has played a key role in implementing executive policy to restitute property stolen from Jews within the Third Reich and Nazi-occupied territory. This Part illuminates that role by first discussing the act of state doctrine and how its proper construction should not operate as a bar against judicial restitution of Holocaust-era art. Then, this Part will discuss modern-era Holocaust litigation and diplomatic developments intended to support judicial restitution of Holocaust-era art.
A. The Act of State Doctrine Is No Bar to Judicial Restitution
Nazi confiscation and expropriation, official governmental taking of property with or without compensation, occurred pursuant to the Nuremberg Laws and other official governmental decrees. 25 Generally, under the act of state doctrine, the courts of one sovereign do not question the acts of another sovereign acting in its sovereign capacity. 26 The doctrine applies -to a case involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court, . . . for [the doctrine] rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency.‖
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The act of state doctrine, however, does not apply to the Nazi regime because it was a criminal organization. 28 In an April 1949 letter, Jack B. Tate, U.S. Department of State Acting Legal Adviser, clarified executive policy concerning judicial restitution of Nazi-era despoiled property, at least insofar as the act of state doctrine was concerned. 29 The letter relayed the following:
[I]t is this Government's policy to undo the forced transfers and restitute identifiable property to the victims of Nazi persecution wrongfully deprived of such property; and . . . the policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the United States for restitution of such property, is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials. In conclusion, although courts have struggled with the correct application of the act of state doctrine and separation of powers implications arising from deferring to the executive branch, the act of state doctrine in no way restricts judicial power to decide cases that call into question acts of the criminal Nazi regime.
B. Modern-Era Holocaust Litigation & Diplomatic Developments
Not all Holocaust-era claims are the same, and the art cases were not subsumed in diplomatic agreements signed after the War or more recently that trumped claims filed in the 1990s. The London Debt Agreement had been signed on February 27, 1953, by twenty nations, including the United States, with the Federal Republic of Germany to suspend payments on external debts, individuals' claims and reparations in deference to the Marshall Plan. 34 The purpose was to -remove obstacles to normal economic relations.‖ 35 In 1991, the London Debt Agreement was lifted, which led to the modern wave of Holocaust-era litigation in the United States. est promised in the Holocaust cases were to (and did) express the view that it was in the foreign policy interests of the United States to dismiss the cases on -any valid legal grounds‖ to achieve -legal peace‖ for the European defendants, 40 which it was hoped would lead to the return of normal diplomatic relations. In exchange, new foundations were established throughout Europe that would consider individual claims and award compensation.
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Claims to art, however, were excluded from the Clinton-era agreements, presumably because the value of the claims would have dwarfed the other claims and there is a great disparity in valuation of the art, much of which could not be located.
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Art became a focus of post-Cold War diplomatic negotiations in 1998 when the United States hosted the Washington Conference and garnered the signatures of forty-four nations to the Washington Principles (the Principles). 43 The non-binding Principles call on nations to facilitate identification of Nazi-looted art and reach -just and fair‖ solutions. 44 In 2009, the Terezín Declaration, signed by forty-six nations, reinforced the Principles. 45 It provides that nations should:
ensure that their legal systems or alternative processes, while taking into account the different legal traditions, facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated and looted art, and . . . make certain that claims to recover such art are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and merits of the claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all parties. 46 Thus, the United States has an international obligation to provide claimants a means to seek restitution. Unlike a number of other countries, the United States has not yet built a commission to resolve such claims. 47 Thus, going to court to assert a -garden-variety‖ state law conversion or replevintype claim remains the only legal mechanism to seek restitution of Holo- caust-era art in the United States.
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As discussed below, the manner in which U.S. courts are dismissing such claims has rendered the United States out of compliance with the very principles it led the world to adopt.
IV. THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE IN NAZI-LOOTED ART
RESTITUTION Unfortunately, the outcome of Holocaust-era art litigation often turns on statutes of limitations and other technical doctrines. This Part will analyze both time-bar and preemption doctrines implicated by such litigation and how courts misapply them, perhaps out of a misplaced deference to incorrect assumptions about federal executive policy.
A. Statutes of Limitations and Other Time-Bar Doctrines
Under the American common law, it is axiomatic that the title to stolen art does not pass to the new owner except in limited circumstances involving certain bailments. However, time-bar doctrines and other technicalities could bar a claim by the rightful owner. 49 For example, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the loss and location of his or her stolen property-or should have done so. 50 Currently, courts are often construing time-bar doctrines in Holocaust art cases in a way that faults survivors and their heirs for waiting too long to seek restitution, even though in most cases it would have been impossible or futile to seek restitution earlier, thereby distorting discovery rule and related jurisprudence.
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For example, one federal court in Michigan ruled that the discovery rule was inapplicable, in part because of the policy to encourage the plaintiff -to diligently pursue his claim,‖ and hence the statute of limitations on one German Jew's claim ran in 1938. 52 Perhaps courts are construing time-bar doctrines to dismiss seemingly meritorious claims out of an unstated and misplaced fear of injecting themselves into foreign affairs. A broad-brush understanding of the class actions filed in the mid-1990s, most of which were dismissed based on various judicial deference doctrines, such as the political question and international comity doctrines, could predispose one to assume that other Holocaust claims must similarly be dismissed. 53 Rather than look into the thorny cases, courts seem to be willing to engage in -judicial abdication of their responsibility for resolving international law issues.‖ 54
B. Preemption
The California state legislature has sought to do something about the judicial misinterpretation of statutes of limitations and discovery rule principles, but judicial trepidation about interfering with foreign affairs seems thus far to have foiled its efforts. The California legislature passed California Civil Procedure Code Section 354.3 in 2002, which extended the statute of limitations for claims seeking restitution from museums and galleries to December 31, 2010.
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As discussed below, California's abandonment of discovery rule principles in favor of a firm statute of limitations for Holocaust-era claims has put the spotlight on the federal-state balance in Holocaust-art restitution, a field that necessarily touches upon foreign affairs.
Earlier Supreme Court case law outside of the Holocaust art context had established that, while there can be -no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government's policy,‖ 56 -even treaties . . . will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy.‖ The panel incorrectly interpreted the significance of executive efforts; the executive never expressed an intent to displace judicial restitution as an option available to survivors seeking to recover their art. In fact, since the War, survivors and heirs have filed successful claims in federal and state courts to recover art and other property. 61 The State Department Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues specifically recognized that the U.S. Government has a limited role in cases involving claimants and private institutions. 62 The State Department has never had any intention of shutting down courts as an avenue of restitution. Nor did the California legislature open courts up for the first time. The legislation simply tried to prevent courts from misapplying discovery rule doctrines to dismiss cases that should not be dismissed. In other words, Section 354.3 seeks to make California's proplaintiff time-bar policy clearer. This is proper because there has never been a federal effort to preempt state authority on the matter.
The Von Saher majority relied on American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, a Supreme Court case that struck down California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (the HVIRA) under the foreign affairs field preemption doctrine. 63 The HVIRA required insurance companies operating in the state to disclose information about policies they or their affiliates wrote in Europe between 1920 and 1945, even if such disclosure was not under the insurance company's direct control and such disclosure was prohibited by European privacy laws. 64 The Clinton-era executive agreements provided that the United States would file statements of interest in Holocaust-era claims capable of resolu-58 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 59 Id. at 961-63. 60 Id. at 967. 61 See, e.g., Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973); Bernstein v. tion in the newly created European foundations. 65 Insurance claims were to be resolved on a voluntary basis by the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (the ICHEIC) after insurance companies provided whatever documentation they could find related to the claims. 66 Even though none of the executive agreements or supporting documents specifically addressed disclosure of insurance policy information, the Garamendi majority held by a five-to-four margin that the California statute interfered with foreign affairs policy objectives implicit in the executive agreements. 67 The Von Saher majority applied Garamendi with an extremely broad brush and concluded that the California legislation was preempted by executive war-era restitution efforts and Clinton-era executive agreements. 68 In effect, the panel ruled that even though state law may provide for a generalized conversion claim with regard to stolen art, a state is powerless to refine its statute of limitations as to Holocaust-specific restitution claims.
A correct interpretation of Garamendi would have recognized that a state does have the power to refine its statute of limitations to prevent its courts from misapplying fluid discovery rule and time-bar principles in Holocaust-era art cases. Focusing on Justice Harlan's concurrence in Zschernig v. Miller, the only other Supreme Court case to find that executive policy short of a treaty preempted state law, illustrates why. Justice Harlan pointed out that, absent a direct conflict between state law and executive policy, -the States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign relations.‖ 69 California's Section 354.3 concerns the statute of limitations on common law property claims, certainly an area of traditional state competence. Arguments about its effect on foreign affairs are likely overblown, as common law Holocaust-era claims may be brought in any state and are subject to the flexible discovery rule-type doctrines that normally apply. For example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently ruled that a claim for a rare book stolen during the War was not barred because the claimant mistakenly, yet reasonably, believed the book had been destroyed during the War. 70 fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves.‖ 71 The HVIRA also expressly stated that it applied to European affiliates of in-state companies, over which California would have had no personal jurisdiction. 72 In contrast, Section 354.3 makes no such extravagant jurisdictional claims; thus, it will apply only to those entities over which California has personal jurisdiction. In fact, the Norton Simon Museum of Pasadena, the defendant in Von Saher, and the art in question are physically located in California; the facts of the case pose absolutely no extravagant personal jurisdiction issues.
Thus, Garamendi does not dictate the result in Von Saher and the Supreme Court should correct judicial misinterpretation of state and judicial power when it comes to Holocaust-era art claims. When judges, in the absence of an applicable executive agreement, construe executive policy so broadly so as to preempt conversion claims as to Holocaust-era art, they are acting as -the expositors of the Nation's foreign policy . . . when the President himself has not taken a clear stand.‖ 73 Justice Ginsburg stated in the Garamendi dissent, -As I see it, courts step out of their proper role when they rely on no legislative or even executive text, but only on inference and implication, to preempt state laws on foreign affairs grounds.‖
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The Von Saher majority incorrectly concluded that the California legislature created a -world-wide forum for the resolution of Holocaust restitution claims‖ 75 and thus could assert -no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility.‖ 76 The majority erred in concluding that the statute -intrudes on the power to make and resolve war.‖ 77 Even though former enemies were not targets-the defendant was an in-state museumthe court held that -the actionable injury at the heart of the statute is the Nazi theft of art,‖ 78 and the statute was enacted -with the aim of rectifying wartime wrongs committed by our enemies or by parties operating under our enemies' protection.‖ 79 For all of the reasons stated above, the Von Saher majority painted the scope of federal restitution efforts far too broadly, thus deferring to an erroneous interpretation of the significance of executive action for foreign affairs. By refusing to reach the merits of the claim, the court was making its own decision, unsupported by any federal interest, that the claim was not worthy of judicial resolution. In other words, to turn a blind eye and feign not to decide is to decide. 80 The Von Saher court thereby engaged in improper policymaking.
The Von Saher majority also ignored the fact that in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, a California case that ultimately resulted in Austria restituting over $300 million worth of Holocaust-era art, 81 the Supreme Court passed up an easy opportunity to shut down a claim on preemption grounds. The Court decided that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA), the only means to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts, provided for jurisdiction over Austria. 82 Moreover, the United States did not file a statement of interest in Altmann, which would have encouraged the court to dismiss the case -on any legal ground.‖ 83 Instead, it filed an amicus brief on the narrow issue of FSIA interpretation. 84 Additionally, the Von Saher majority opinion unsuccessfully distinguished art restitution from the property restitution sought in Alperin v. Vatican Bank. In Alperin, another split Ninth Circuit panel authorized pursuit of -garden-variety property‖ state law claims against the Vatican for allegedly accepting property from the genocidal, Holocaust-era Croatian Ustasha regime, while finding slave and forced labor claims preempted under the executive preemption doctrine. 85 In rejecting an argument that the political question doctrine prohibited judicial resolution of the claim, the Alperin court noted that -[r]eparation for stealing, even during wartime, is not a claim that finds textual commitment in the Constitution [to the federal executive branch].‖ 86 Thus, a court would have power to award restitution or money damages for such stolen property. 87 In contrast, the Von Saher majority simply rejected without support the -garden-variety property‖ characterization of suits seeking restitution of property converted during a time of war. 88 There is no reason to welcome Croatian war-era state law property claims into court while closing the door on Holocaust-era art claims. State law reformers secured new California legislation. On the judicial front, another important California case has surpassed a significant hurdle to proceed against Spain. Additionally, there is a possibility that a commission will be created in the State Department to attempt to resolve Holocaust-era art claims out of court.
A. California Legislative Reform Efforts
While the petition for certiorari in Von Saher was pending before the Supreme Court, 91 the California legislature enacted Assembly Bill 2765, which was signed into law by then-Governor Schwarzenegger on August 30, 2010. 92 The legislation requires actual discovery (presumably both of the claim and entity to sue) and doubles the length of time allowed between actual discovery and commencement of the cause of action to recover art and other real property from three to six years. 93 The new and pending causes of action commenced on or before December 31, 2017. 94 It would also include actions that were -dismissed based on the expiration of statutes of limitation in effect prior to the date of enactment‖ of the bill so long as either the judgment is not yet final or the time for filing an appeal has not yet passed. 95 The statute also includes a definition of -duress‖ broader than that implied in any U.S. case to date. 96 There are limits to the new statute. Present-day possessors of art can still assert legal and equitable defenses, including the statute of limitations (of course) and the equitable defense of laches, which would bar a claim if the plaintiff's unreasonable and inexcusable delay caused defendant prejudice in his or her ability to defend the suit. 97 Like the earlier California statute, there is no limitation requiring that the museums and galleries sued be located in California, 98 although they must, of course, be subject to personal jurisdiction there under International Shoe and its progeny.
B. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain While this state legislation was pending, the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling that permitted another Holocaust-era art suit to go forward. In Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, the en banc panel held that Spain and its instrumentality, the Madrid-based Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, are subject to jurisdiction under the expropriation exception of the FSIA even though it was the Nazis, not Spain, that engaged in the expropriation.
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Cassirer held that the plain language of the expropriation exception, which provides for jurisdiction over claims to property -taken in violation of international law,‖ has no requirement as to who must actually engage in the taking. 100 The court then found that the Foundation is engaged in sufficient commercial activity in the United States-advertising for tourism-to satisfy the FSIA's commercial activity requirement. 101 The timeliness of the claim was not at issue in the appeal, 102 but the fact that the Ninth Circuit is allowing the claim to proceed is somewhat in tension with the Von Saher holding that Holocaust-era art claims are preempted. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in the case and, as it did in Von Saher, asked the Solicitor General to submit a brief explaining the executive branch's views.
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C. A State Department Commission?
The State Department is currently developing a plan to establish a Nazi-Looted Art Commission, but its mandate would be limited to researching and mediating or arbitrating claims only if both parties agree.
